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Abstract—This paper considers an artificial noise (AN)-aided
transmit design for multi-user MIMO systems with integrated
services. Specifically, two sorts of service messages are combined
and served simultaneously: one multicast message intended for
all receivers and one confidential message intended for only
one receiver and required to be perfectly secure from other
unauthorized receivers. Our interest lies in the joint design of
input covariances of the multicast message, confidential message
and artificial noise (AN), such that the achievable secrecy rate
and multicast rate are simultaneously maximized. This problem
is identified as a secrecy rate region maximization (SRRM)
problem in the context of physical-layer service integration. Since
this bi-objective optimization problem is inherently complex to
solve, we put forward two different scalarization methods to
convert it into a scalar optimization problem. First, we propose
to prefix the multicast rate as a constant, and accordingly,
the primal biobjective problem is converted into a secrecy rate
maximization (SRM) problem with quality of multicast service
(QoMS) constraint. By varying the constant, we can obtain
different Pareto optimal points. The resulting SRM problem
can be iteratively solved via a provably convergent difference-
of-concave (DC) algorithm. In the second method, we aim to
maximize the weighted sum of the secrecy rate and the multicast
rate. Through varying the weighted vector, one can also obtain
different Pareto optimal points. We show that this weighted sum
rate maximization (WSRM) problem can be recast into a primal
decomposable form, which is amenable to alternating optimiza-
tion (AO). Then we compare these two scalarization methods in
terms of their overall performance and computational complexity
via theoretical analysis as well as numerical simulation, based on
which new insights can be drawn.
Index Terms—Physical-layer service integration, Artificial
Noise, Convex Optimization, Secrecy rate region
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Recently, physical-layer service integration (PHY-SI), a
technique of combining multicast service and confidential
service into one integrated service for one-time transmission
at the physical layer, has received much attention in wire-
less communications. For one thing, PHY-SI caters to the
demand for high transmission rate and secure communication,
which has been identified as the key targets that need to
be effectively addressed by fifth generation (5G) wireless
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systems [1]. Besides, compared with the conventional upper-
layer-based approach, PHY-SI enables coexisting services to
share the same resources by solely exploiting the physical
characteristics of wireless channels, thereby significantly in-
creasing the spectral efficiency. This property makes PHY-SI
a prominent approach to satisfy the ever-increasing need for
radio spectrum. The technique of PHY-SI could also find a
wide range of applications in the commercial and military
areas. For example, many commercial applications, e.g., ad-
vertisement, digital television, Internet telephony, and so on,
are supposed to provide personalized service customization.
As a consequence, confidential service and public service are
collectively provided to satisfy the demand of different user
groups. In battlefield scenarios, it is essential to propagate
commands with different security levels to the frontline. The
public information should be distributed to all soldiers, while
the confidential information can only be accessed by specific
soldiers. Such emerging applications lead to a crucial problem:
how to establish the security of confidential service while not
compromising the quality of public service?
B. Related Works
Let us first have a very brief review on physical-layer
security, a technique that lays foundation for the research
on PHY-SI. The broadcast nature of wireless medium makes
privacy an inherent concern. Physical layer security technique
is playing an increasingly important role in wireless commu-
nication recently. It can secure communications information-
theoretically at the physical layer without using secret keys
whose distribution or management may become difficult in
e.g., ad-hoc wireless networks. Different strategies against
eavesdropping have been developed with various levels of
channel state information (CSI) available to the transmitter
(see the comprehensive overview in [2]–[6]). Liu and Poor
first coined the term confidential broadcasting in [7], [8]
and established the corresponding secrecy capacity region.
In confidential broadcasting, a transmitter broadcasts multi-
ple confidential messages to all receivers. Each confidential
message is intended for one specified receiver but required to
be perfectly secret from the others. Some efforts have been
made in e.g., [9], [10] to maximize the sum secrecy rate in
the scenario of confidential broadcasting.
The study of PHY-SI can be traced back to Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner’s seminar work in [11]. In the basic model of PHY-SI,
a transmitter sends a common message to two receivers, and
simultaneously, sends a confidential message intended only
2for one receiver and kept perfectly secure from the other
one. Under discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DMBC)
setup, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner gave a closed-form expression of
the maximum rate region that can be applied reliably under
the secrecy constraint (i.e., the secrecy capacity region). In
recent years, this kind of approach has gained renewed interest,
especially that in various multi-antenna scenarios, such as
Gaussian broadcast channels [12]–[15], and bidirectional relay
channels [16], [17]. In [12], the authors extended the results
in [11] to a general MIMO Gaussian case by adopting the
channel-enhancement argument. Further, the works [13], [14]
considered the case with two confidential messages intended
for two different receivers. The resulting secrecy capacity
region is proved to be attainable by combining the secret dirty-
paper coding (S-DPC) with Gaussian superposition coding.
Furthermore, in [16] and [17], Wyrembelski and Boche amal-
gamated broadcast service, multicast service and confidential
service in bidirectional relay networks, in which a relay
adds an additional multicast message for all nodes and a
confidential message for only one node besides establishing
the conventional bidirectional communication. Nonetheless,
the main goal of the aforementioned papers is just to obtain
capacity results or to characterize coding strategies that lead
to certain rate regions [18]. For implementation efficiency, it is
also important to treat physical layer service integration from
a signal processing point of view. In particular, optimal or
complexity-efficient transmit strategies have to be character-
ized, so that the achieved performance could reach/approach
the boundary of the secrecy capacity region. Such strategies
are usually given by optimization problems, which generally
turn out to be nonconvex. Along with this comes the fact that
most works on PHY-SI end once a certain characterization of
a rate region is derived.
Recently, to fill in the gap between the previous information-
theoretic results and practical implementation, there is growing
interest in analyzing PHY-SI from a signal processing point of
view. In [12], the authors proposed a re-parameterizingmethod
to devise transmit strategies for achieving the secrecy boundary
performance. However, this method is only applicable to a very
simple two-user MISO scenario. Besides, it involves solving
a sequence of convex feasibility problems, which is compu-
tationally expensive. To improve it, the work [19] proposed a
quality-of-service (QoS)-based method to seek the boundary-
achieving transmit strategies. Its basic idea is to establish
the tradeoff between the secrecy rate and the multicast rate
by maximizing the secrecy rate while ensuring the multicast
rate above a given threshold. This method is demonstrated
as effective in characterizing the secrecy boundary, and thus
triggered research endeavors on extending the result to a
more general and realistic setting. Notable results include
the extension to the multi-user [20] and imperfect CSI [21],
[22] settings. Even so, relatively less work focussed on the
MIMO channel setup, due to the intractability of the associated
optimization problems. In [23], the authors circumvented
the intractability by proposing a generalized singular value
decomposition (GSVD) based transmission scheme. Using
GSVD, multicast message and confidential message can be
perfectly decoupled and the resulting problem is easier to
handle. However, this result is not applicable to the general
multi-user MIMO case. In addition, it is also interesting
to incorporate artificial noise (AN) into consideration, as
such technique has been shown to be effective in enhancing
transmission security [24]–[28]. Specifically, the authors in
[24], [25]–[27] and [28] respectively showed that AN is of
paramount importance to physical-layer security when there
exist multiple eavesdroppers in the network, when the CSI of
eavesdropper(s) is imperfectly known at the transmitter, and/or
when eavesdroppers are randomly located in the network.
C. Main Contributions
In this paper, we delve into the AN-aided transmit precoding
design in PHY-SI under a general multi-user MIMO case.
Specifically, two sorts of service messages are combined and
promulgated at the same time: a multicast message intended
for all receivers, and a confidential message intended for
merely one authorized receiver. The confidential message
must be kept perfectly secure from all other unauthorized
receivers. Meanwhile, AN is employed to degrade the poten-
tial eavesdropping of the unauthorized receivers. This paper
aims to jointly optimize the input covariance matrices of the
multicast message, confidential message and AN, to maximize
the achievable secrecy and multicast rates simultaneously, or
equivalently, to maximize the achievable secrecy rate region.
This secrecy rate region maximization (SRRM) problem turns
out to be a biobjective optimization problem. Since the re-
parameterizing method is invalid in a general MIMO case, we
develop two scalarization methods to convert it into an easier-
to-handle scalar version for characterizing its Pareto boundary.
1) In the first method, we propose to fix the multicast rate
as a constant. Through varying the value of the con-
stant, this method could yield different secrecy boundary
points. Since the Pareto optimal points must reside on
the boundary of the achievable rate region, this method
is bound to provide a complete set of the Pareto optimal
points. Though the resultant secrecy rate maximization
(SRM) problem is nonconvex by nature, we show this
problem actually falls into the context of difference-
of-concave (DC) programming [29]. Hence, it can be
handled by classical DC algorithm with convergence
guarantee.
2) As for the second method, a weighted sum-based scalar-
ization is introduced. The crux of this scalarization
method is to optimize the weighted sum of the two
objectives with different weight vectors. By varying
the weight vector, this method gives rise to different
Pareto optimal solution. To solve this weighted sum
rate maximization (WSRM) problem, we reveal its hid-
den decomposability by recasting it as an equivalent
form amenable to alternating optimization (AO). AO
algorithm is naturally employed to solve the WSRM
problem. It can be proved that this AO algorithm must
converge to one stationary point of the WSRM problem.
3) It is particularly worth mentioning that though the DC
and AO algorithms have been applied to address the
issue of physical-layer security before in e.g., [24], [30],
[31], none of these works considered integrating an
3additional multicast message. Our paper is an initial
attempt to study the application of DC and AO to the
emerging PHY-SI system, which turns out to be a harder
task than its counterpart in physical-layer security due
to the coexisting multicast service.
Then we compare these two sorts of scalarization methods
in terms of their overall performance and computational com-
plexity. The comparison results reveal that the first method
is more efficacious in finding all Pareto optimal points than
the second one. The advantage of the second method lies in
its problem structure, which provides the service provider a
solution to maximizing the overall revenue. Besides, we show
that the DC algorithm is more time-efficient at low transmit
power than the AO algorithm. Interestingly, the numerical
results indicate that at high transmit power, the AO algorithm
becomes the more time-efficient one.
D. Organization and Notations
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
the system model description and problem formulation. The
optimization aspects of our formulated problems are addressed
in Section III and IV, corresponding to the first and the
second scalarization methods, respectively. The comparison
results are given in Sections V. Section VI presents simulation
results to show the efficacy of our proposed methods. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
The notation of this paper is as follows. Bold symbols in
capital letter and small letter denote matrices and vectors,
respectively. (·)H , rank(·) and Tr(·) represent conjugate trans-
pose, rank and trace of a matrix, respectively. R+ and H
n
+
denote the set of nonnegative real numbers and of n-by-n
Hermitian positive semidefinite (PSD) matrices. The n × n
identity matrix is denoted by In. x ∼ CN (µ,Ω) denotes
that x is a complex circular Gaussian random vector with
mean µ and covariance Ω. A  0 (A ≻ 0) implies that
A is a Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix. ‖·‖
represents the vector Euclidean norm. K represents a proper
cone, and K∗ represents a dual cone associated with K .
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the downlink of a multiuser system in which
a multi-antenna transmitter serves K receivers, and each
receiver is equipped with multiple antennas. Assume that
all receivers have ordered the multicast service and receiver
1 further ordered the confidential service1. To enhance the
security performance, the transmitter utilizes a fraction of its
transmit power to send artificially generated noise to interfere
the unauthorized receivers (eavesdroppers), i.e., receiver 2 to
receiverK . We assume in this paper that all receivers are static
and that all the communication links undergo slow frequency-
flat fading.
Remark 1: In this paper, we assume that only one receiver
orders the confidential service within a single time slot. In
1In this paper, we assume that only one receiver orders the confidential
service within a single time slot. In practice, this assumption is valid under the
case where the confidential service is provided to all receivers in a round-robin
manner, i.e., the time slots are assigned to each subscriber of the confidential
service in equal portions and in circular order.
practice, this assumption is valid under the cases where the
confidential service is provided to all receivers in a round-robin
manner to strengthen the security of confidential messages and
to reduce the operational complexity at the transmitter.
The received signal at receiver k is modeled as
yk = Hkx+ zk, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K (1)
where Hk ∈ CNr,k×Nt is the channel response between the
transmitter and receiver k; and Nt and Nr,k are the number
of transmit antennas employed by the transmitter and kth
receiver, respectively. zk is independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit
variance. x ∈ CNt is the coded transmit message, which
consists of three independent components, i.e.,
x = x0 + xc + xa, (2)
where x0 is the multicast message intended for all receivers,
xc is the confidential message intended for receiver 1, and
xa is the artificial noise. We assume x0 ∼ CN (0,Q0),
xc ∼ CN (0,Qc) [12], where Q0 and Qc are the transmit
covariance matrices. The AN xa follows a distribution xa ∼
CN (0,Qa), where Qa is the AN covariance. The CSI on all
links is assumed to be perfectly known at the corresponding
transmitter and receivers in that all receivers have to register in
the network for subscribing the multicast service. In practice,
the CSI at the receivers can be obtained from the channel
estimation of the downlink pilots. CSI at the transmitter can
be acquired via uplink channel estimation in time division
duplex (TDD) systems. The design of a high-quality channel
estimation scheme is beyond the scope of this paper. Note
that the full CSI assumption is commonly adopted in the area
of physical layer security/multicasting, especially in MIMO
channels [10], [24], [30], [32]–[36].
For ease of exposition, let us define K
∆
= {1, 2, ...,K}
and Ke
∆
= K/{1}, which denote the indices of all receivers
and of all unauthorized receivers, respectively. Denote R0
and Rc as the achievable rates associated with the multicast
and confidential messages, respectively. Then an achievable
secrecy rate region Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ) is given as the set of
nonnegative rate pairs (R0, Rc) satisfying [12]
R0 ≤ min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa)
Rc ≤ Cb(Qc,Qa)− max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Qc,Qa),
(3)
where
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa) =
log |I+ (I+Hk(Qc +Qa)H
H
k )
−1
HkQ0H
H
k |, (4a)
Cb(Qc,Qa) = log |I+ (I+H1QaH
H
1 )
−1
H1QcH
H
1 |, (4b)
Ce,k(Qc,Qa) = log |I+ (I+HkQaH
H
k )
−1
HkQcH
H
k |,
(4c)
and Tr(Q0+Qc+Qa) ≤ P with P being total transmit power
budget at the transmitter.
The secrecy rate region (3) implies that all receivers first
decode their common multicast message by treating the con-
fidential message as noise, and then receiver 1 acquires a
4clean link for the transmission of its exclusive confidential
message, where there is no interference from the multicast
message. This can be achieved by utilizing the encoding
schemes proposed in [11].
To maximize this achievable secrecy rate region, our goal
is to find the boundary-achieving Q0, Qa and Qc, which is
also known as Pareto optimal solutions to this SRRM problem.
Specifically, with perfect CSI available at the transmitter, we
must first solve the following optimization problem, which is a
biobjective maximization problem with cone K = K∗ = R2+.
max
Q0,Qc,Qa
(
w.r.t. R2+
)
(min
k∈K
Cm,k, Cb − max
k∈Ke
Ce,k)
s.t. Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (5a)
Q0  0,Qc  0,Qa  0, (5b)
where, with a slight abuse of notations but for notational
simplicity, the explicit dependence of Cm,k, Cb and Ce,k
on (Q0,Qc,Qa) is omitted. Since the SRRM problem is a
biobjective maximization problem, it is necessary to harness
some method of scalarization to convert it into an easier-to-
handle scalar version.
Remark 2: It is also viable to consider the scenario where
all receivers order the confidential service and all confidential
messages are propagated concurrently by the transmitter, i.e.,
the integration of multicasting and confidential broadcasting.
The merit of this scheme lies in its higher spectral effi-
ciency and low latency. However, this comes at the expense
of much higher operational complexity at the transmitter,
especially when the number of users increases. Thus, our
considered PHY-SI scheme is particularly desired in delay-
tolerant applications or when the transmitter possesses limited
computational capacity for security-related computations.
III. A DC-BASED APPROACH TO THE SRRM PROBLEM
In this section, we develop our first scalarization method
to solve (5). The basic problem formulation is a secrecy rate
maximization (SRM) with imposed quality of multicast service
(QoMS) constraints.
A. Scalarization
In particular, our method is to move the multicast rate
maximization part to the constraint, i.e., we fix at the time
being the multicast rate as a constant τms ≥ 0. As a result,
the biobjective SRRM problem (5) will be degraded into a
scalar maximization problem, which is shown in (6).
R(τms) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa
Cb(Qc,Qa)− max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Qc,Qa)
s.t. min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa) = τms, (6a)
Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (6b)
Q0  0,Qa  0,Qc  0. (6c)
In (6), R(τms) is the optimal objective value, τms can be
interpreted as the preset requirement on the multicast rate,
and accordingly, the constraint (6a) can be interpreted as a
QoMS constraint. To guarantee the feasibility of problem (6),
τms cannot exceed a threshold τmax given by
τmax = max
Q00,Tr(Q0)≤P
min
k∈K
log
∣∣I+HkQ0HHk
∣∣ . (7)
The value of τmax can be numerically obtained by solving (7)
via the convex optimization solver CVX [37].
This sort of problem formulation, in fact, enables us to
find one boundary point (τms, R(τms)) of the secrecy rate
region Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ) by solving (6). All boundary points
of Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ) can be found if we traverse all possible
τms’s lying within [0, τmax] and store the corresponding op-
timal objective values. Since the Pareto optimal solution to
(5) must reside on the boundary of Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ), i.e., the
Pareto optimal set of (5) is a subset of the boundary set of
Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ), all Pareto optimal solution to (6) can also
be found by this means.
However, problem (6) is nonconvex. Especially, the deter-
minant equality constraint (6a) is very difficult to handle. To
circumvent this difficulty, we pay our attention to the following
relaxed problem of (6), in which the equality constraint (6a)
is replaced by the inequality constraint (8a).
R˜(τms) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa
Cb(Qc,Qa)− max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Qc,Qa)
s.t. min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa) ≥ τms, (8a)
Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (8b)
Q0  0,Qa  0,Qc  0. (8c)
Apparently, any optimal solution to (6) is feasible to (8) in
the sense that replacing (6a) with (8a) yields a larger feasible
solution set. Hence, problem (8) has R(τms) ≤ R˜(τms) in
general. Interestingly, we show that R(τms) = R˜(τms) can
always be achieved without loss of optimality to (8).
Lemma 1: Problem (8) is a tight relaxation to problem (6). In
other words, the rate pair (τms, R˜(τms)) must be a boundary
point of Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ).
Proof: The proof can be easily accomplished by construc-
tion. Suppose that the constraint (8a) is satisfied with strict
inequality, we can always multiply Q0 by a scalar ν (ν < 1)
to make (8a) active, yet without decreasing the objective value
of (8) and violating the total power constraint (8b). This fact
implies that there always exists an optimal solution to (8) such
that the constraint (8a) is satisfied with equality, and thus,
accomplishes the proof.
Lemma 1 implies that problem (8) admits an optimal
(Q∗0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) with min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q
∗
0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) = τms. Hence,
(Q∗0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) is also optimal to (6). The proof of Lemma
1 reveals that such an optimal (Q∗0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) can always be
constructed algorithmically based on the following procedures:
Corollary 1: Suppose that (Q∗0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) is an
optimal solution returned by solving problem (8). If
min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q
∗
0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) = τms, then output (Q
∗
0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a)
as an optimal solution of problem (6). Otherwise,
solve the following equation with regard to ν, i.e.,
min
k∈K
Cm,k(νQ
∗
0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) = τms, via bisection search
within the unit interval [0, 1], and output (νQ∗0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) as
an optimal solution of problem (6).
5Next, we will point out two special cases, under which
problem (8) is equivalent to problem (6); or equivalently, any
optimal solution to (8) is achieved with constraint (8a) active.
This is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the system configurations sat-
isfy either one of the following conditions:
Condition 1: The number of antennas at the transmitter is
larger than that at the authorized receiver, i.e., Nt > Nr,1.
Condition 2: The number of antennas at the transmitter is
larger than the sum of the antenna number at the unauthorized
receivers, i.e., Nt >
∑
k∈Ke
Nr,k.
Then the rate pair (τms, R˜(τms)) must be a Pareto optimal
point of (5), and all Pareto optimal points of (5) can be
obtained by solving (6) with different τms’s lying within the
interval [0, τmax].
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Remark 3: Proposition 1 bridges the Pareto optimal points
of (5) to the boundary points of Cs(H1,H2, P ). When either
Condition 1 or Condition 2 is satisfied, all Pareto optimal
points of (5) are also the boundary points of Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ),
and vice versa.
B. DC Iterative Algorithm
We now focus on solving the relaxed problem (8) derived
in the last subsection. Problem (8) still remains nonconvex
due to its objective function and constraint (8a). To deal with
it, we first equivalently transform it into its epigraph form by
introducing a slack variable η, i.e.,
R(τms) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa,η
Cb(Qc,Qa)− η
s.t. Ce,k(Qc,Qa) ≤ η, ∀k ∈ Ke (9a)
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa) ≥ τms, ∀k ∈ K (9b)
Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (9c)
Q0  0,Qa  0,Qc  0. (9d)
Next, we will show that problem (9) constitutes a DC-
type programming problem, which can be iteratively solved
by employing the DC algorithm.
To begin with, we reformulate the capacity function
Cb(Qc,Qa), Ce,k(Qc,Qa) and Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa) into a DC-
type form, given by
Cb(Qc,Qa) = φ1(Qc,Qa)− ϕ1(Qa),
Ce,k(Qc,Qa) = φk(Qc,Qa)− ϕk(Qa), ∀k ∈ Ke (10)
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa) = ηk(Q0,Qc,Qa)− φk(Qc,Qa), ∀k ∈ K
in which we define
φk(Qc,Qa) = log
∣∣I+Hk(Qc +Qa)HHk
∣∣ , ∀k ∈ K
ϕk(Qa) = log
∣∣I+HkQaHHk
∣∣ , ∀k ∈ K (11)
ηk(Q0,Qc,Qa) = log
∣∣I+H1(Qc +Qa +Q0)HH1
∣∣ , ∀k ∈ K.
Substituting (10) into problem (9), we obtain
R(τms) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa,η
φ1(Qc,Qa)− ϕ1(Qa)− η
s.t. ϕk(Qa)− φk(Qc,Qa) + η ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Ke (12a)
ηk(Q0,Qc,Qa)− φk(Qc,Qa) ≥ τms, ∀k ∈ K (12b)
Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (12c)
Q0  0,Qa  0,Qc  0. (12d)
Since φk(Qc,Qa), ϕk(Qa) and ηk(Q0,Qc,Qa) are all
concave w.r.t. (Q0,Qc,Qa), one can easily notice that the
objective function of (6) and constraints (12a) and (12b) are all
in a difference-of-concave form. This property makes problem
(5) fall into the context of DC program [29], which can be
iteratively solved via DC algorithm.
Our next endeavor is to show the DC approach to (12) math-
ematically. Its basic idea is to locally linearize the nonconcave
parts in (12) at some feasible point via Taylor series expansion
(TSE), and then iteratively solve the linearized problem. To
this end, we introduce the TSE via the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ( [31]): An affine Taylor series approximation of
a function f(X) : RM×N → R can be expressed at X˜ as
below.
f (X) ≈ f(X˜) + vec (f ′ (X))
H
vec(X− X˜). (13)
The TSE above enables us to reformulate the primal non-
concave parts of (12) into a linear form. In particular, by
applying Lemma 2 and the fact ∂ (log |X|) = Tr
(
X−1∂X
)
,
ϕ1(Qa) can be approximated as
ϕ1(Qa) = log
∣∣I+H1QaHH1
∣∣
≈ ϕ1(Q˜a) + (vec (S))
Hvec
(
Qa − Q˜a
)
(a)
= ϕ1(Q˜a) + Tr
[
S(Qa − Q˜a)
]
,
∆
= ϕ˜1(Qa) (14)
in the objective function of (12), where Q˜a is a given
transmit covariance matrix, S
∆
= HH1
(
I+H1Q˜aH
H
1
)−1
H1
and the equality (a) is due to the fact that Tr(AHB) =
(vec(A))Hvec(B) for appropriate dimensions of A and B.
Likewise, φk(Qc,Qa), appearing in the constraints (12a) and
(12b), can be approximated as
φk(Qc,Qa) = log
∣∣I+Hk(Qc +Qa)HHk
∣∣
≈ φk(Q˜c, Q˜a) + Tr
[
U(Qc − Q˜c)
]
+Tr
[
U(Qa − Q˜a)
]
∆
= φ˜k(Qc,Qa), (15)
in which U is determined by
U = HHk (I+Hk(Q˜c + Q˜a)H
H
k )
−1Hk. (16)
6Based on the approximations above, the original QoMS-
constrained SRM problem (12) can be reformulated as
R¯(τms) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa,η
φ1(Qc,Qa)− ϕ˜1(Qa)− η
s.t. ϕk(Qa)− φ˜k(Qc,Qa) + η ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Ke (17a)
ηk(Q0,Qc,Qa)− φ˜k(Qc,Qa) ≥ τms, ∀k ∈ K (17b)
Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (17c)
Q0  0,Qa  0,Qc  0. (17d)
where R¯(τms) is the optimal objective value of (9), serving
as an approximation to R(τms). According to the relationship
between a concave function and its Taylor series expansion, it
is immediate to get
ϕ1(Qa) ≤ ϕ˜1(Qa), ∀Qa  0,
φk(Qc,Qa) ≤ φ˜k(Qc,Qa), ∀Qa  0,Qc  0. (18)
As a consequence, any feasible solution to (17) should also
be feasible to (12), and R¯(τms) ≤ R(τms) must hold.
This approximated problem (17) is convex with regard to
(w.r.t.) (Q0,Qc,Qa) and hence (Q0,Qc,Qa) can be itera-
tively obtained by solving problem (17) via some off-the-
shelf interior-point algorithm, e.g., CVX. We summarize our
proposed iterative algorithm for solving (12) in Algorithm 1.
To acquire the secrecy rate region, we need to traverse τms
lying within the interval [0, τmax] and store the corresponding
objective value of (17).
Algorithm 1 Iterative method for solving (12)
1: Initiate n = 0 and choose an arbitrary starting point
(Q˜c,n, Q˜a,n) feasible to (17)
2: Repeat
3: Solve (17) with Q˜c = Q˜c,n and Q˜a = Q˜a,n, and obtain
(Q∗c ,Q
∗
a), which is the optimal solution of (17);
4: Update Q˜c,n+1 = Q
∗
c , Q˜a,n+1 = Q
∗
a;
5: Update n = n+ 1;
6: Until the convergence conditions are satisfied.
7: Output Q˜c,n and Q˜a,n.
Remark 4: In Algorithm 1, the initialization of (Q˜c,0, Q˜a,0)
plays a crucial role in influencing the total iteration times. Let
us define
(
Qic,Q
i
a
)
as the output solution in ith traversal of
τms. The following “warmstart operation” could be adopted to
initialize (Q˜c,0, Q˜a,0) for achieving a fast convergence rate:
Warmstart Operation: We start the traversal of τms from
τms = τmax. In the first traversal, Q˜c,0 and Q˜a,0 are both
initialized as 0. In the ith (i > 1) traversal, (Q˜c,0, Q˜a,0) is
initialized as the solution output by Algorithm 1 in the (i−1)th
traversal.
C. Convergence Analysis
As one can see, the basic merit of DC lies in its tractability,
which caters to the numerical optimization using the parser-
solver. As an additional merit, the proposed DC approach has
a theoretically provable guarantee on its solution convergence,
which will be demonstrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Every limit point of (Q∗0,Q
∗
c) is a stationary
point of problem (6)
Proof: The proof is a direct application of [29, Th 10],
and thus omitted here for simplicity.
IV. AN AO-BASED APPROACH TO THE SRRM PROBLEM
In this section, we develop our another scalarization method,
referred to as weighted-sum method, to solve (5). The basic
problem formulation is a WSRM problem, which can be
solved via an AO-based approach. Here we should point
out that the application of AO to SRM problem has been
observed in some existing papers, i.e., [24]. Nonetheless, the
AO algorithm we used in this section is a nontrivial extension
of that in [24]. Specifically, the objective function in [24] only
contains a single secrecy rate term. While in our considered
scenario, an extra multicast rate term is incorporated, which
brings some new issues, say, the convergence proof, that
should be tackled.
A. Scalarization
The basic idea of the weighted-sum method is to introduce
a so-called weight vector [38] that is positive in the dual
cone K∗ = R2+, and then to transform the primal vector
optimization problem into a scalar optimization problem. By
varying the vector, we can obtain different Pareto optimal
solutions of (5).
To put into context, the Pareto boundary of (3) can be
characterized by the solution of
max
Q0,Qc,Qa,R0,Rc
R0 + λcRc
s.t. R0 ≤ min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa)
Rc ≤ Cb(Qc,Qa)− max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Qc,Qa)
(5a)-(5b) satisfied,
(19)
in which λc ∈ [0,+∞) and λ = [1, λc] is our introduced
weight vector. In general, the optimal (R0, Rc) to (6) is the
point where a straight line with slope −1/λc is tangent to the
Pareto boundary. Before proceeding, let us first point out some
special cases of problem (6).
1) When λ = [1, 1], the optimal (R0, Rc) turns out to be
the so-called utilitarian point, also referred to as “sum-
rate” point in communications.
2) The single-service points are the two points where
R0 = 0 and where Rc = 0, respectively. When R0 = 0,
problem (6) is degraded into a conventional AN-aided
SRM problem in MIMO wiretap channel. When Rc = 0,
the maximum R0 can be derived by solving the same
convex optimization problem as (7).
B. AO Iterative Algorithm
We are now in a position to determine the tractable ap-
proaches to the WSRM problem (19). First, one can notice
that by discarding R0 and Rc as slack variables, problem (19)
is equivalent to the following optimization problem.
R(λc) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa
λc(Cb − max
k∈Ke
Ce,k) + min
k∈K
Cm,k
s.t. Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (20a)
Q0  0,Qc  0,Qa  0. (20b)
7The obstacle of solving (20) mainly lies in the non-
smoothness of its objective function, which negates the use of
many derivative-related iterative algorithms. As a result, we
next develop a derivative-free AO iterative algorithm to solve
(20). To this end, we will first need to transform the WSRM
problem (20) into a form amenable to AO.
Lemma 3 ( [24]): Let E ∈ CN×N be any matrix satisfying
E ≻ 0. Define the function f(S) = −Tr(SE) + log |S|+N .
Then
log
∣∣E−1∣∣ = max
S∈CN×N ,S0
f(S), (21)
and the optimal solution to the right-hand side (RHS) of (34)
is S∗ = E−1.
Applying Lemma 3 to Cb, Ce,k and Cm,k, one can obtain
Cb = max
S10
ϕb(Qc,Qa,S1), (22a)
Ce,k = min
Sk0
ϕe,k(Qc,Qa,Sk), ∀k ∈ Ke, (22b)
Cm,k = max
Uk0
ϕm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa,Uk), ∀k ∈ K, (22c)
where we define
ϕb(Qc,Qa,S1) = −Tr(S1(I+H1QaH
H
1 ) + log |S1|+Nr,1
+ log
∣∣I+H1(Qa +Qc)HH1
∣∣ , (23a)
ϕe,k(Qc,Qa,Sk) = − log |Sk| − log
∣∣I+HkQaHHk
∣∣−Nr,k
+ Tr(Sk(I+Hk(Qa +Qc)H
H
k )), (23b)
ϕm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa,Uk) = −Tr(Uk(I+Hk(Qc +Qa)H
H
k )
+ log |Uk|+ log
∣∣I+Hk(Q0 +Qc +Qa)HHk
∣∣+Nr,k,
(23c)
in which {Sk}k∈K and {Uk}k∈K are slack variables satisfying
Sk  0 and Uk  0 for ∀k ∈ K.
Following the matrix manipulations in [24], we have
max
k∈Ke
min
Sk
ϕe,k(Qc,Qa,Sk)
= min
{Sk}k∈Ke
max
k∈Ke
ϕe,k(Qc,Qa,Sk),
(24)
and
min
k∈K
max
Uk
ϕm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa,Uk)
= max
{Uk}k∈K
min
k∈K
ϕm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa,Uk).
(25)
Substituting (22a)-(22c) into (20) and making use of (24) and
(25), one can check that problem (20) is equivalent to the
following optimization problem.
R(λc) = max
Q0,Qc,Qa,
{Sk}k∈K,{Uk}k∈K
f(Q0,Qc,Qa, {Sk}k∈K , {Uk}k∈K)
s.t. Tr(Q0 +Qc +Qa) ≤ P, (26a)
Q0  0,Qc  0,Qa  0, (26b)
in which we define
f(Q0,Qc,Qa, {Sk}k∈K , {Uk}k∈K) =
λc(ϕb(Qc,Qa,S1)− max
k∈Ke
ϕe,k(Qc,Qa, {Sk}k∈Ke))
+ min
k∈K
ϕm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa, {Uk}k∈K).
(27)
The upshot of this reformation is that problem (20) becomes
primal decomposable. Specifically, problem (26) is convex
w.r.t. either (Q0,Qc,Qa) or ({Sk}k∈K , {Uk}k∈K). Hence,
AO is naturally employed to solve (26). With (Q0,Qc,Qa)
fixed, the optimal solution of ({Sk}k∈K , {Uk}k∈K) admits an
analytical expression, according to Lemma 3, given by
S∗1 = (I+H1QaH
H
1 )
−1, (28a)
S∗k = (I+Hk(Qa +Qc)H
H
k )
−1, ∀k ∈ Ke, (28b)
U∗k = (I+Hk(Qa +Qc)H
H
k )
−1, ∀k ∈ K, (28c)
in which we utilize the fact that {Sk}k∈K and {Uk}k∈K
are decoupled among ϕb, ϕe,k and ϕm,k. Comparatively,
with ({Sk}k∈K , {Uk}k∈K) fixed, the optimal solution of
(Q0,Qc,Qa) can be obtained by solving a convex optimiza-
tion problem as below, i.e.,
(Q∗0,Q
∗
c ,Q
∗
a) =
arg max
(Q0,Qc,Qa)∈F
f(Q0,Qc,Qa, {Sk}k∈K , {Uk}k∈K),
(29)
where F denotes the feasible set of (20), which is convex.
The whole AO process for solving (26) is given in Algo-
rithm 2. In line 6 of Algorithm 2, the convex subproblem can
be solved via CVX. Following the similar warmstart operation
introduced in Remark 4, the iteration times of Algorithm 2
can be significantly decreased.
Algorithm 2 AO algorithm for solving (26)
1: Initiate n = 1, and (Q0c ,Q
0
a) ∈ F ;
2: Repeat
3: Sn1 = (I+H1Q
n−1
a H
H
1 )
−1;
4: Snk = (I+Hk(Q
n−1
a +Q
n−1
c )H
H
k )
−1, ∀k ∈ Ke;
5: Unk = (I+Hk(Q
n−1
a +Q
n−1
c )H
H
k )
−1, ∀k ∈ K;
6: (Qn0 ,Q
n
c ,Q
n
a) = arg max
(Q0,Qc,Qa)∈F
f(Q0,Qc,Qa,
{Snk}k∈K , {U
n
k}k∈K);
7: n = n+ 1;
8: Until the convergence conditions are satisfied.
9: Output (Qn0 ,Q
n
c ,Q
n
a).
C. Convergence Analysis
It can be verified that the AO algorithm produces a non-
decreasing objective value of (26). Besides, the following
convergence result is always guaranteed.
Proposition 3: Suppose that (Qn0 ,Q
n
c ,Q
n
a) is the solution
generated by the AO algorithm in nth iteration, then the
sequence {(Qn0 ,Q
n
c ,Q
n
a)}n must converge to one stationary
point (i.e., Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point) of the primal
WSRM problem (20).
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Since the global optimal solutions to problem (20) hitherto
remains inaccessible, our achieved secrecy rate region would
serve as a lower bound on Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ), which achieves
KKT optimality.
V. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED METHODS
In the previous sections, we present two tractable convex
formulations of the SRRM problem (5). This naturally leads
8to the question about the relative performance of the two
formulations. In the following subsections, we address this
question by comparing their performance and computational
complexity in solving (5).
A. Performance Analysis
As introduced in the preceding sections, the QoMS-based
scalarization can yield a complete set of boundary points of
Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ), which contains all Pareto optimal points
of (5). The resulting scalar problem (8) aims to maximize
the secrecy rate and meanwhile maintain the QoMS above a
given threshold. Predictably, the use of AN should be effective
merely at low QoMS region, since AN exerts a negative
effect on the multicasting performance. To guarantee the high
demand for QoMS, AN has to be prohibitive at high QoMS
region. This QoMS-constrained SRM is a generalization of
traditional SRM in physical-layer security, and provides the
transmitter with some insights in how to tradeoff the security
performance and the multicasting performance.
As for the weighted-sum scalarization method, the necessary
condition for it to find all Pareto optimal points is that the
secrecy rate region should be convex. Besides, its performance
is also dependent on the precision of λc. The traversal of λc
should span from zero to an extremely large number with
appropriate step, so that each Pareto optimal points can be
detected. Nonetheless, the weighted-sum problem structure
has an interesting pricing interpretation from the field of
economics. To elaborate a little further, let us define p0 and
pc as the unit price for the secrecy rate and the multicast rate,
respectively, charged by the service provider. To maximize its
revenue, the service provider should be concerned about how
to solve the WSRM problem in (19) with setting λc = pc/p0.
The use of AN could also be explained in this context. It is
evident to see when p0 ≫ pc, the revenue from multicasting
transmission would dominate the objective function of (19),
and thus, eliminating AN would be helpful in increasing the
overall revenue.
In all, these two scalarization methods are suitable for
different application scenarios and provide different insights.
Nonetheless, the QoMS-based scalarization could yield all
Pareto optimal points, while the weighted-sum scalarization
might only yield some of them, dependent on the shape of the
secrecy rate region.
Remark 5: Besides the QoMS-based and weighted-sum
scalarization methods, some other scalarization methods have
been proposed in literature to find the complete Pareto set
for biobjective optimization, e.g., the weighted Tchebycheff
method [39]. However, to implement this method, one has
to first obtain the single-service point of the confidential
message (cf. (30)) and then solve a highly nonconvex max-min
optimization problem.
Rmaxc = max
Qc0,Tr(Qc)≤P
log
∣∣I+H1QcHH1
∣∣
−max
k∈K
log
∣∣I+HkQcHHk
∣∣ . (30)
Unfortunately, problem (30) is nonconvex, and so the optimal
solution to (30) may not be obtained, which invalidates the
use of the weighted Tchebycheff method.
B. Complexity Analysis
The major computational complexity of the two scalariza-
tion methods comes from solving the problems (17) and (29).
While both of problems (17) and (29) are convex, they are not
in a standard semidefinite programming (SDP) form, owing to
the logarithm functions therein. To solve them, a successive
approximation method embedded with a primal-dual interior-
point method (IPM) is employed, say by CVX. As is known,
the arithmetic complexity for the generic primal-dual IPM to
solve a standard SDP is O(max {m,n}4n1/2 log(1/ε)) [40],
in whichm, n and ε represent the number of linear constraints,
the dimension of the positive semidefinite cone and the
solution accuracy, respectively. Therefore, the complexity of
solving (17) or (29) is O(LSAmax {2K,Nt}4N
1/2
t log(1/ε)),
where LSA denotes the number of successive approximations
used. Since we are not aware of the relation between LSA and
Nt, this complexity expression is rather rough.
However, by utilizing the following approximation [41]:
log
∣∣I+HQHH ∣∣ = Tr(HQHH) +O(∥∥HQHH∥∥), (31)
all logarithm terms in problems (17) and (29) can be ap-
proximated by a trace function at low transmit power. This
approximation further converts the convex problems (17) and
(29) into SDP ones, which makes it possible to acquire a more
accurate big-O expression of the computational complexity for
low transmit power.
Specifically, consider (17), which has three linear matrix
inequality (LMI) constraints of size Nt, and 2K LMI con-
straints of size 1 after introducing the approximation (31).
Moreover, for (17), the number of decision variables is on the
order n1 = 3N
2
t +1. Then, when a generic path-following IPM
is used to solve problem (17), the total arithmetic computation
cost is on the order of [42]
T1 =
√
2K + 3Ntφ(n1),
φ(n1) = n1(2K + 3N
3
t ) + n
2
1(2K + 3N
2
t ) + n
3
1
(32)
with n1 = O(3N2t + 1).
On the other hand, for solving (29), we need to introduce
two additional slack variables to move the maximum and
minimum terms in the objective function of (29) to the
constraints. Hence, the number of decision variables is on
the order of n2 = 3N
2
t + 2, and (29) also has three LMI
constraints of size Nt, and 2K LMI constraints of size 1. The
total arithmetic computation cost for solving (29) is on the
order of
T2 =
√
2K + 3Ntφ(n2),
φ(n2) = n2(2K + 3N
3
t ) + n
2
2(2K + 3N
2
t ) + n
3
2
(33)
with n2 = O(3N2t + 2).
Comparing (32) and (33), one can note that the total
arithmetic computation cost of solving the two problems is
comparable, with T2 slightly greater than T1 due to n2 > n1.
This observation implies that the QoMS-based scalarization
is more time-efficient at low transmit power. This is also
consistent with our following simulation results, as we shall
see in Section VI.
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Fig. 1. DC algorithm: Convergence of the multicast rate
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the
secrecy rate region derived from the two proposed methods,
compared with two other existing strategies. The first one is
the no-AN transmission, i.e., prefixingQa as 0 in problem (5).
Thus, its achieved secrecy rate region can also be derived via
the DC and AO algorithms. Another one is the traditional ser-
vice integration using time division multiple address (TDMA),
which assigns the confidential message and multicast message
to two orthogonal time slots. Its maximum secrecy rate and
multicast rate can be obtained by seeking the single-service
points of Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ). For the fairness of comparison,
the secrecy rate and multicast rate achieved by this TDMA-
based strategy should be halved [17].
In the first subsection, the convergence results of both
algorithms are presented. The second subsection gives the
comparison between these two algorithms in terms of achiev-
able performance and computational complexity.
A. Convergence Results
In this subsection, we assume Nt = 5, Nr,k = 3 for all k ∈
K, and K = 4. The channel matrices are randomly generated
from an i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and unit variance. According to Proposition 1, since Nt >
Nr,1, the optimal solution to (8) is attained when the constraint
(8a) holds with equality.
First, we evaluate the convergence of the DC algorithm.
Especially, we are concerned about whether the primal con-
straint (8a) is violated by our approximation. Setting τms as
2 bps/Hz, Fig. 1 shows the convergence of the multicast rate
in the iteration with different transmit power. Q˜c,0 and Q˜a,0
are both initiated as 0. The algorithm stops iterating when the
difference between two successive values of R¯(τms) returned
by the algorithm is less than or equal to 10−4. One can observe
that, the multicast rates ultimately converge to our predefined
multicast rate with a limited number of iterations in all tested
transmit powers. This observation indicates the efficacy of TSE
in approximating the multicast rate. Then we also plot the
achieved secrecy rates and the approximated secrecy rates in
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Fig. 3. AO algorithm: Convergence of the weighted sum rate
Fig. 2. The general observation of Fig. 1 is also applicable to
Fig. 2.
The convergence results of the AO algorithm are presented
in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, we set λc = 1 to seek the sum-rate
point. Q0c and Q
0
a are both initialized as (P/(2Nt))INt . The
algorithm stops iterating when the difference between two
successive values of R¯(λc) is less than or equal to 10
−4. As
one can observe from Fig. 3, the achieved weighted sum rate is
monotonically increasing and finally converges with a limited
number of iterations in all tested transmit powers. In addition,
we find out that the AN covariance matrixQa output by AO is
no longer diagonal. This implies that the associated AN design
is spatially selective rather than isotropic, which blocks the
eavesdroppers much more effectively. One can also note that
the increase in the weighted sum rate is particularly remarkable
when the transmit power is high. After all, higher transmit
power means that the transmitter can allocate more power to
the confidential message transmission, while not compromis-
ing the multicast performance. The extra power allocated to the
confidential message can be used to generate more interference
at the eavesdropper and/or strengthen the signal reception at
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the intended receiver, whereby more remarkable improvement
is observed.
B. Performance Comparison
In this subsection, we focus on two sorts of system config-
uration. The first one is the same as that in the last subsection.
Besides, we consider another sort of system configuration:
Nt = Nr,1 = 4, Nr,k = 5 for all k ∈ Ke, and K = 4.
Under the second system configuration, neither Condition 1
nor Condition 2 is satisfied.
First, we will show the secrecy rate regions achieved by the
first system configuration. Overall results are shown in Fig. 4,
with P set as 10dB and 20dB, respectively. Fig. 4 reveals
two general trends. First, our AN-aided scheme achieves a
secrecy rate region larger than the no-AN one. The striking
gap indicates the efficacy of AN in expanding the secrecy
rate region. However, the gap between these two strategies
dramatically reduces when R0 increases. This phenomenon
agrees with our conjecture in Section V-A. The second ob-
servation is that our proposed strategies, though only attain
a lower bound on Rs({Hk}k∈K, P ), is sufficient to achieve
significantly larger secrecy rate regions than the TDMA-
based one. This observation also implies that PHY-SI is an
effective approach to improve the spectral efficiency. Then let
us compare the achievable performance of the two proposed
scalarization methods. One can notice that the performance
gap between these two methods is negligible in the tested
system configuration, especially when P = 10dB.
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy rate regions achieved by the
second system configuration. Still, the secrecy rate region
with AN is larger than the one without AN and the one
achieved by TDMA. Besides, we can observe two very in-
teresting phenomena. First, when we increase the transmit
power from 10dB to 20dB, the secrecy rate regions practically
expand in the horizontal direction. That is, under the second
system configuration, the increasing transmit power mainly
contributes to the multicast message transmission, rather than
the confidential message transmission. This can be interpreted
from the transmit degree of freedom (d.o.f.). The total d.o.f. of
unauthorized receivers is
∑K−1
k=2 Nr,k = 15, much higher than
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the transmit d.o.f. Nt = 4. The high d.o.f. at the unauthorized
receivers leads to the d.o.f. bottleneck at the transmitter and
thus compromises the overall secrecy performance. Second,
one can notice that when P = 20dB:
1) there exist some boundary points residing on a line,
marked by the red dashed lines, that are not Pareto optimal
to (5). Apparently, these points cannot be detected by the
weighted-sum scalarization, but can be easily detected by the
QoMS-based scalarization;
2) the QoMS-based scalarization detects more Pareto op-
timal points than the weighted-sum scalarization. This is
attributed to the insensitivity of the weighted-sum scalarization
to the points residing on an approximately horizontal bound-
ary. To detect these boundary points, one has to precisely
adjust the value of λc to get different tangent points.
C. Complexity Comparison
TABLE I
AVERAGED RUNNING TIMES (IN SECS.)
Method
Power (dB)
0 4 8 12 16 20
DC algorithm 6.07 8.89 12.91 17.35 21.18 30.84
AO algorithm 7.57 11.58 11.04 12.61 13.61 17.11
Finally, we tabulated the averaged running times of DC
and AO for obtaining a boundary point in Table I under
the same setting as Fig. 4. As seen, the DC algorithm runs
faster than the AO algorithm when the transmit power is low.
This phenomenon is consistent with our preceding analysis
in Section V-B. However, at high transmit power, the DC
algorithm scales nearly exponentially with P and gradually
spends more time converging in each iteration than the AO
algorithm. This observation indicates that the two proposed
scalarization methods might exhibit a performance-complexity
tradeoff at high transmit power.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the AN-aided transmit design
for multiuser MIMO broadcast channel with confidential ser-
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vice and multicast service. The transmit covariance matrices
of confidential message, multicast message and AN were de-
signed to maximize the achievable secrecy rate and achievable
multicast rate simultaneously. To deal with this biobjective
optimization problem, two different sorts of scalarization were
introduced to transform this SRRM problem into a scalar opti-
mization problem. In the QoMS-based scalarization, the scalar
problem is an SRM problem with QoMS constraints, while in
the weighted-sum scalarization, the scalar problem is a WSRM
problem. DC and AO algorithms were utilized to solve the
QoMS-constrained SRM problem and the WSRM problem,
respectively. Both algorithms can converge to a stationary
point of the primal problems. Further, we gave a detailed
comparison between the two proposed scalarization methods.
The comparison results indicated that at low transmit power,
the QoMS-based scalarization is superior to the weighted-sum
one in terms of achievable performance and computational
complexity. On the other hand, at high transmit power, these
two methods exhibit a tradeoff between achievable perfor-
mance and computational complexity. Numerical results also
confirmed the effectiveness of AN in expanding the secrecy
rate region.
As a future direction, it would be interesting to analyze
the robust service integration scheme to combat the possible
CSI uncertainties caused by channel aging, and to take into
account some application-specific requirements in 5G wireless
communication system, e.g., the mobility of terminals and the
overhead in CSI acquisition.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
First, we claim that problem (8) has a following interesting
property provided that Condition 1 or Condition 2 is satisfied.
Property 1: The maximum objective value of problem (8),
R(τms), is obtained only when the equality in (8a) holds.
Proof: The proof of Property 1 can be accomplished
by contradiction. Assume that the maximum value of
problem (8) is obtained at the solution (Qˆ0, Qˆc, Qˆa)
and the equality in (8a) does not hold, i.e.,
min
k∈K
log|I+ (I+Hk(Qˆc + Qˆa)HHk )
−1
HkQˆ0H
H
k | > τms.
Our next step is to construct a new solution (Q¯0, Q¯c, Q¯a)
from (Qˆ0, Qˆc, Qˆa), which achieves a larger objective value
and satisfies the constraint (8a) with equality. Let us first
elaborate upon the construction method under Condition 1.
1) Case for Condition 1: Specifically, we multiply Qˆ0 by
a scaling factor ξ (0 < ξ < 1), add a positive semidefinite
(PSD) matrix E = ρI− ρHH1 (H1H
H
1 )
−1H1 to Qˆa and keep
Qˆc constant, i.e., Q¯0 = ξQˆ0, Q¯a = Qˆa + E and Q¯c =
Qˆc, where the coefficient ρ controls the power of E. Note
that E is the orthogonal complement projector of HH1 , and
its existence is guaranteed by Condition 1. To keep the total
transmit power constant, the coefficient ρ should be chosen
to satisfy (1 − ξ)Tr(Qˆ0) = Tr(E) = ρ(Nt − Nr,1), that is,
ρ = (1−ξ)Tr(Qˆ0)Nt−Nr,1 . To proceed, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4 ( [43]): For matrices A,∆  0 and B ≻ 0, the
following inequality hold:
|A+B|
|B|
≥
|A+B+∆|
|B+∆|
. (34)
Then, by applying Lemma 4, one can obtain
Cm,k(Qˆ0, Qˆc, Qˆa)
= log|I+ (I+Hk(Qˆc + Qˆa)H
H
k )
−1
HkQˆ0H
H
k |
> log|I+ (I+Hk(Q¯c + Q¯a)H
H
k )
−1
HkQ¯0H
H
k |
= Cm,k(Q¯0, Q¯c, Q¯a) (35)
for any k ∈ K. Thus, by adjusting the value of ξ, the equality
in (8) could be achieved.
To proceed, we will show that a larger objective value could
always be achieved by (Q¯0, Q¯c, Q¯a). By reapplying Lemma
4, it is easy to get
Ce,k(Q¯c, Q¯a)
= log|I+ (I+HkQ¯aH
H
k )
−1HkQ¯cH
H
k |
= log|I+ (I+Hk(Qˆa +E)H
H
k )
−1
HkQˆcH
H
k |
< log|I+ (I+HkQˆaH
H
k )
−1HkQˆcH
H
k |,
= Ce,k(Qˆc, Qˆa), ∀k ∈ Ke. (36)
Meanwhile, due to H1EH
H
1 = 0, it is easy to see
Cb(Q¯c, Q¯a) = Cb(Qˆc, Qˆa). (37)
Combining (36) with (37), we obtain
Cb(Q¯c, Q¯a)− max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Q¯c, Q¯a)
> Cb(Qˆc, Qˆa)− max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Qˆc, Qˆa), (38)
i.e., a larger objective value can be found with (Q¯0, Q¯c, Q¯a).
This fact is contrary to the primal assumption.
2) Case for Condition 2: The only difference between the
proof for Condition 1 and Condition 2 lies in the construction
method of (Q¯0, Q¯c, Q¯a). To begin with, let us first define
a matrix Hua
∆
= [HH2 ,H
H
3 , · · · ,H
H
K ]
H ∈ C
∑
k∈Ke
Nr,k×Nt ,
which stacks all of the unauthorized receivers’ channel matri-
ces. Then, we multiply Qˆ0 by a scaling factor ξ (0 < ξ < 1),
add a PSD matrix E = ρI − ρHHua(HuaH
H
ua)
−1Hua to Qˆc
and keep Qˆa constant, i.e., Q¯0 = ξQˆ0, Q¯c = Qˆc + E and
Q¯a = Qˆa, where the coefficient ρ controls the power of E. E
is the orthogonal complement projector of HHua, the existence
of which is guaranteed by Condition 2. The coefficient ρ
should be chosen to satisfy ρ = (1−ξ)Tr(Qˆ0)Nt−
∑
k∈Ke
Nr,k
to keep the
total transmit power constant.
Again, by exploiting Lemma 4 and carrying out some matrix
manipulations, one can verify that (Q¯0, Q¯c, Q¯a) can achieve
a larger objective value than (Qˆ0, Qˆc, Qˆa) with the constraint
(8a) active. This fact contradicts the primal assumption.
Summarizing the conclusions drawn from the two cases
above, we have accomplished the proof of Property 1.
Property 1 makes the proof of [19, Theorem 1] fully
applicable to the proposition here. The remaining parts of the
proof can be found in [19] and are omitted here for simplicity.
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B. Proof of Proposition 3
Firstly, we introduce slack variables α and β to reexpress
(9) as
max
Q0,Qc,Qa,α,β
λc(Cb − β) + α
s.t. Ce,k ≤ β, ∀k ∈ Ke, (39a)
Cm,k ≥ α, ∀k ∈ K, (39b)
(20a)-(20b) are satisfied.
Equivalently, it suffices to prove that every limit point
(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) of the iterates generated by the AO algo-
rithm, together with α˜ = min
k∈K
Cm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) and β˜ =
max
k∈Ke
Ce,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) is a KKT point of (39).
Due to the compactness of (Q0,Qc,Qa),
there must exist a subsequence, denoted by
{(Qnl0 ,Q
nl
c ,Q
nl
a , {S
nl
k }
K
k=1, {U
nl
k }
K
k=1)}l, such that
{(Qnl0 ,Q
nl
c ,Q
nl
a , {S
nl
k }
K
k=1, {U
nl
k }
K
k=1)}l converges to a
limit point (Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, {S˜k}Kk=1, {U˜k}
K
k=1) as l → ∞.
Next, our proof is composed of two steps. First, we will show
that the limit point (Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, {S˜k}Kk=1, {U˜k}
K
k=1) satisfy
the following properties.
S˜1 = arg max
S10
ϕb(Q˜c, Q˜a,S1), (40a)
S˜k = arg min
Sk0
ϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a,Sk), ∀k ∈ Ke (40b)
U˜k = arg max
Uk0
ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a,Uk), ∀k ∈ K (40c)
(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) =
arg max
(Q0,Qc,Qa)∈F
f(Q0,Qc,Qa, {S˜k}
K
k=1, {U˜k}
K
k=1).
(40d)
Second, we will check the KKT conditions of problems (40a)-
(40d) to build a bridge between (40) and the KKT conditions
of problem (39).
Step 1. By noting that
S
nl
1 = arg max
S10
ϕb(Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,S1), (41a)
Snlk = arg min
Sk0
ϕe,k(Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,Sk), ∀k ∈ Ke (41b)
U
nl
k = arg max
Uk0
ϕm,k(Q
nl−1
0 ,Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,Uk), ∀k ∈ K
(41c)
(Qnl0 ,Q
nl
c ,Q
nl
a ) =
arg max
(Q0,Qc,Qa)∈F
f(Q0,Qc,Qa, {S
nl
k }
K
k=1, {U
nl
k }
K
k=1),
(41d)
we have
ϕb(Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,S
nl
1 ) ≥ ϕb(Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,S1), ∀S1  0
(42a)
ϕe,k(Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,S
nl
k ) ≤ ϕe,k(Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,Sk),
∀Sk  0, ∀k ∈ Ke (42b)
ϕm,k(Q
nl−1
0 ,Q
nl−1
c ,Q
nl−1
a ,U
nl
k ) ≥ ϕm,k(Q
nl−1
0 ,Q
nl−1
c ,
Qnl−1a ,Uk), ∀Uk  0, ∀k ∈ K (42c)
and
f(Q0,Qc,Qa, {S
nl
k }
K
k=1, {U
nl
k }
K
k=1)
≤f(Qnl0 ,Q
nl
c ,Q
nl
a , {S
nl
k }
K
k=1, {U
nl
k }
K
k=1) (43)
≤f(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, {S˜k}
K
k=1), {U˜k}
K
k=1), ∀(Q0,Qc,Qa) ∈ F ,
where the second inequality of (43) holds for the reason that
AO algorithm yields non-descending objective values. Then
letting l →∞ in (42) and (43) will lead to (40a)-(40d).
Step 2. Then it follows from (40a)-(40d) and the positive
definiteness of {S˜k}Kk=1 and {U˜k}
K
k=1 that
∇S1ϕb(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜1) = 0, S˜1  0, (44a)
∇Skϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k) = 0, S˜k  0, ∀k ∈ Ke (44b)
∇Ukϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k) = 0, U˜k  0, ∀k ∈ K. (44c)
By carrying out some matrix manipulations to (44), it is easy
to obtain that
S˜1 = (I+H1Q˜aH
H
1 )
−1  0, (45a)
S˜k = (I+Hk(Q˜a + Q˜c)H
H
k )
−1  0, ∀k ∈ Ke (45b)
U˜k = (I+Hk(Q˜a + Q˜c)H
H
k )
−1  0, ∀k ∈ K (45c)
Meanwhile, by introducing slack variables α and β, (40d) is
shown to be equivalent to
max
Q0,Qc,Qa,α,β
λc(ϕb(Qc,Qa, S˜1)− β) + α
s.t. ϕe,k(Qc,Qa, S˜k) ≤ β, ∀k ∈ Ke, (46a)
ϕm,k(Q0,Qc,Qa, U˜k) ≥ α, ∀k ∈ K, (46b)
(Q0,Qc,Qa) ∈ F . (46c)
It is easy to see that (Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a), together with β˜ =
max
k∈Ke
ϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k) and α˜ = min
k∈K
ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k)
is an optimal solution of problem (12). Consequently,
(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, β˜, α˜) satisfy the KKT conditions of (46),
shown in (46) at the top of last page. In (46),
({ρk}k∈Ke , {µk}k∈K, γ,A,B,C) are all dual variables per-
taining to the constraints in (46).
To proceed, by applying Danskin’s theorem [44], one can
verify the following equalities must hold.
∇QcCb(Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Qcϕb(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜1), (48a)
∇QaCb(Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Qaϕb(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜1), (48b)
∇QcCe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Qcϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k), (48c)
∇QaCe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Qaϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k), (48d)
∇QcCm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Qcϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k),
(48e)
∇QaCm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Qaϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k),
(48f)
∇Q0Cm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) = ∇Q0ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k).
(48g)
Then substituting (45b) and (45c) into ϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k)
and ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k), one can obtain
Ce,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, p˜m) = ϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, p˜m, S˜k), ∀k ∈ Ke (49a)
Cm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) = ϕe,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k), ∀k ∈ K (49b)
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λc∇Qcϕb(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜1)−
∑
k∈Ke
ρk∇Qcϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k) +
∑
k∈K
µk∇Qcϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k)− γI+C = 0, (46a)
λc∇Qaϕb(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜1)−
∑
k∈Ke
ρk∇Qaϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k) +
∑
k∈K
µk∇Qaϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k)− γI+A = 0, (46b)
∑
k∈K
µk∇Q0ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k)− γI+B = 0, (46c)
ϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k) ≤ β˜, ∀k ∈ Ke (46d)
ρk(ϕe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a, S˜k)− β˜) = 0, ∀k ∈ Ke (46e)
ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k) ≥ α˜, ∀k ∈ K (46f)
µk(ϕm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a, U˜k)− α˜) = 0, ∀k ∈ K (46g)∑K
k=1
ρk = 1, (46h)
∑K
k=1
µk = 1, (46i)
A  0,B  0,C  0, (46j)
γ ≥ 0, ρk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ Ke, µk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, (46k)
Tr(Q˜0 + Q˜c + Q˜a) ≤ P, Q˜0  0, Q˜c  0, Q˜a  0, (46l)
γ(Tr(Q˜0 + Q˜c + Q˜a)− P ) = 0, (46m)
Tr(BQ˜0) = 0,Tr(CQ˜c) = 0,Tr(AQ˜a) = 0, (46n)
λc∇QcCb(Q˜c, Q˜a)−
∑
k∈Ke
ρk∇QcCe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a)− γI+C+
∑
k∈K
µk∇QcCm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) = 0, (49a)
λc∇QaCb(Q˜c, Q˜a)−
∑
k∈Ke
ρk∇QaCe,k(Q˜c, Q˜a)− γI+A+
∑
k∈K
µk∇QaCm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) = 0, (49b)
∑
k∈K
µk∇Q0Cm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a)− γI+B = 0, (49c)
Ce,k(Q˜c, Q˜a) ≤ β˜, ∀k ∈ Ke (49d)
ρk(Ce,k(Q˜c, Q˜a)− β˜) = 0, ∀k ∈ Ke (49e)
Cm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a) ≥ α˜, ∀k ∈ K (49f)
µk(Cm,k(Q˜0, Q˜c, Q˜a)− α˜) = 0, ∀k ∈ K (49g)
(46h)-(46n) satisfied. (49h)
Finally, by plunging (48) and (49) into (46), we obtain
(49), shown at the top of last page. Remarkably, (49a)-(49h)
are KKT conditions of the WSRM problem (39). This fact
completes the proof.
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